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Personhood: Law, Common Sense, and 
Humane Opportunities 
Helen M. Alvaré* 
It is pointless to approach Professor Chatman’s argument on 
its own terms (to wit, “tak[ing] our laws seriously,” or equal 
application across myriad legal categories of “full personhood” 
rights) because these terms are neither seriously intended nor 
legally comprehensible. Instead, her essay is intended to create the 
impression that legally protecting unborn human lives against 
abortion opens up a Pandora’s box of legal complications so 
“ridiculous” and “far-fetched” that we should rather just leave 
things where they are under the federal Constitution post-Roe v. 
Wade1 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.2 This impression, in 
turn, is a tool to forward Professor Chatman’s personal preference 
for legal abortion—which she gives away by calling legal abortion 
by its political name: “the right to choose.”  
But her arguments, sounding in law, about the alleged chaos 
to flow from a law protecting unborn human lives from abortion 
are false on the grounds of basic legal principles concerning federal 
constitutional and immigration law, as well as the legal principles 
underlying state legislation and statutory interpretation. I will set 
these legal principles out below before turning to the more 
interesting and legally plausible matter of whether or not 
lawmakers should choose to take into account both the needs of 
pregnant women and the humanity of unborn life when crafting 
laws affecting both, whether the situation involves immigration, 
incarceration, or women’s need for financial support. 
First, Professor Chatman’s reading of federal constitutional 
law is erroneous. She suggests that a state law defining unborn 
human lives as persons would “tie our Constitution into a knot no 
 
 * Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University 
(J.D., Cornell University; M.A., The Catholic University of America; B.S., 
Villanova University). 
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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court can untangle.”3 This cannot be true. The Supreme Court has 
the last word on the meaning of “person” for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “life” to persons. In Roe v. 
Wade, the Court determined that the unborn were not included.4 
If state laws had the last word, then the Roe Court could not have 
overturned the dozens of state laws5 protecting unborn human 
lives against killing by abortion. But it did. Today, if states like 
Alabama and others legally define unborn humans as persons 
protected against death by abortion,6 either the Supreme Court 
will strike down the state’s law as inconsistent with the Court’s 
definitive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, or it will 
overturn Roe v. Wade (and Planned Parenthood v. Casey) in order 
to let states again have the last word regarding the protection due 
unborn life, as they did pre-1973. In either event, the Constitution 
is not “tie[d] . . . into a knot”; rather any constitutional issue will 
be interpreted by the Court, as per usual.7  
 
 3. Carliss N. Chatman, If a Fetus Is a Person, It Should Get Child Support, 
Due Process and Citizenship, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 91, 97 (2020). 
 4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156–58. 
 5. James A. Knecht, Comment, A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case 
Law on Abortion: The Contradictions and the Problems, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 177, 
179–81 & nn.25–30 (1972). In 1972, prior to the Roe v. Wade decision, twenty-six 
states permitted abortions only to save the mother’s life. Five states only 
permitted abortion to save the life of the mother or child. One state and the 
District of Columbia only permitted abortion to preserve the life or health of the 
mother. Eleven states permitted abortion only under the framework put forth in 
the Model Penal Code revisions of 1962, which essentially allowed abortion only 
if there was a “substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely 
impair the physical or mental health of the mother, or that the child would be 
born with a grave physical or mental defect; the pregnancy resulted from rape; or 
the pregnancy resulted from incest or other felonious intercourse” Id. at 180 
(citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 
1962)). One state appeared to have banned abortion altogether, and one state only 
allowed abortion to save the mother’s life or if the pregnancy resulted from rape. 
Only five states had limited or no abortion law at all. Id. at 181–82. Professor 
Knecht further clarified: “Semantic problems arise because the statutes state that 
an unborn child has a life which may be saved, thereby implying that an unborn 
child is alive, while the proponents of reform believe that a child is not alive until 
it is born. The import of these statutes, however, is that they view the fetus as a 
legal entity deserving of protection.” Id. at 179, n.26.  
 6. Alabama Human Life Protection Act, ALA. CODE 1975 §§ 26-23H-3, 
26-23H-4 (2019). 
 7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803).  
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Regarding immigration law, Professor Chatman states that 
“[i]n states that move the line to define life as beginning as early 
as conception, personhood and citizenship will begin as soon as a 
woman knows she is pregnant.”8 She also states that this would 
“creat[e] a system with two-tiered fetal citizenship.”9 But these 
statements make no sense. Despite some bold new scholarship on 
the possibility that states could determine “citizenship” separately 
from federal law,10 this proposal remains in the realm of theory; it 
is well known that citizenship is a matter governed by federal law. 
In the words of a recent article in the Stanford Law Review: “In 
many ways, the regulation of immigration is a quintessential 
federal function. Developing a uniform national scheme that 
dictates who may enter the United States, who must leave, and 
who may become a national citizen is a power exclusively reserved 
to the federal government.”11 
Professor Chatman is also mistaken on a basic principle of 
legislative drafting and interpretation: state laws inevitably define 
the leading terms employed in a statute to apply only within the 
four corners of that statute. Of course, it is possible for a word to 
have the same meaning across statutes, but only if the relevant 
pieces of legislation say so. Commonly, however—and as done in 
the Alabama statute12 Professor Chatman derides—a statute says 
“As used in this act, the term X means such and such.” Thus, each 
statute defines its terms so as to serve the statute’s precise object.   
Innumerable state statutes use the language of “person” 
regarding innumerable rights and obligations, but each clearly 
confines the meaning to the statutory purpose at hand: for 
example, who can vote, who can enter into a contract, who can run 
for office, who can commit a crime, who can suffer certain crimes, 
etc. To give a highly relevant and specific example: today—when 
abortion must be legal everywhere, post-Roe—many states define 
unborn human beings as “persons” (whether or not eventually 
 
 8.  Chatman, supra note 3, at 97. 
 9. Id at 96. 
 10. See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of 
State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2015). 
 11. Id. at 870. 
 12. Alabama Human Life Protection Act § 26-23H-3. 
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“born alive”) for purposes of both criminal homicide laws and/or 
wrongful death actions.13 But these laws have not been interpreted 
to protect unborn humans from being killed by abortion, despite 
their use of the language of personhood. Instead, such laws define 
“person” only for purposes of the law at hand, using language 
similar to that appearing in the recent Alabama abortion statute: 
“As used in this chapter, the following terms shall have the 
following meanings . . . .”14 This makes eminent sense in the 
present legal climate. Legislators know that abortion must be legal 
as long as Roe stands, but they may still want to pass a law to 
punish third parties responsible for killing the children of 
pregnant women who did not seek abortion. Or—to engage more of 
Professor Chatman’s examples—legislators may want to protect 
unborn human beings from being killed via abortion, while 
understanding as a matter of common sense that unborn humans 
cannot separately obtain a trial or an arraignment. For matters of 
convenience and expense, the privacy concerns of pregnant women, 
or even because of the high rates of miscarriage,15 legislators might 
not want to extend Social Security or census laws to unborn lives. 
But at the very same time, a state might have such a high regard 
for human life at every stage that it would want to punish any 
deliberate, or even negligent, killing that goes against the mother’s 
will.  
Turning now to the legally plausible and more intrinsically 
interesting possibilities raised by Professor Chatman’s editorial: 
should lawmakers choose to take the humanity of unborn life into 
 
 13. State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-Enhancement for Crimes 
Against Pregnant Women, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/86LG-3H6Q (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 14. Alabama Human Life Protection Act § 26-23H-3. 
 15. What Are the Miscarriage Rates by Week?, MED. NEWS TODAY, 
https://perma.cc/XGR8-HJEW (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (generating the 
following statistics on the relationship between maternal age and risk of 
miscarriage: at age thirty-five there is a 15% chance of pregnancy loss, at age 
forty a 35% chance, and at ages over forty-five about a 50% chance) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Miscarriage, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://perma.cc/G32J-DDAK (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (“About 10 to 20 percent 
of known pregnancies end in miscarriage.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); see also ACOG Practice Bulletin: Early Pregnancy Loss, AM. C. OF 
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (May 2015) https://perma.cc/2M99-6UDY (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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account when crafting laws affecting not only mothers, but also 
their unborn offspring? I think the answer is a clear “yes,”—for 
reasons that might appeal both to those who take the label 
“pro-life” and “pro-choice.” Both women and children might benefit 
from such laws.  
Many of the areas of law Professor Chatman identified—
especially child support, incarceration, immigration, and tax law—
while not legally affected by personhood definitions in any abortion 
ban, could be vehicles for assisting both pregnant women and their 
children, although this is not how Professor Chatman uses them.  
More than a few scholars have written on these subjects.  
Regarding child support, for example—because pregnant 
women are in need of both tangible and intangible solidarity and 
support during pregnancy, and because fathers should take joint 
responsibility—why not implement “preglimony,” as suggested by 
law professor Shari Motro?16 And because a pregnant woman’s 
environment will affect her unborn child’s health, why not legally 
require attention to the health care needs of mother and child 
during incarceration?17 And because it would be beneficial to both 
 
 16. See generally Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647 (2011) 
(defining preglimony as a “preganancy-support obligation” when an unwanted 
pregnancy occurs); Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 917 
(2010); Shari Motro, Responsibility Begins at Conception, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 
2012), https://perma.cc/87KV-F2VY (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The preglimony concept was originally 
developed in her two law review articles. 
 17. See Jennifer Hahn-Holbrook et al., Placental Corticotropin-Releasing 
Hormone Mediates the Association Between Prenatal Social Support and 
Postpartum Depression, 1 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. SCI. 253 (2013) (noting that strong 
social support from families, which includes emotional support, help with tasks 
or other material assistance, and the woman feeling cared for, valued, or accepted 
lowers stress hormones in pregnant women) Nazli Hossain & Elizabeth 
Westerlund Triche, Environmental Factors Implicated in the Causation of 
Adverse Pregnancy Outcome, 31 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY 240 (2007) 
(concluding that exposure to metals, such as lead, and radiation can cause 
congenital defects and that mental and physical stress can lead to birth defects, 
low birth weight, preterm delivery, and preeclampsia). The neighborhood a 
woman lives in may also impact the pregnancy by inducing psychological distress, 
depression, or anxiety. The socioeconomic impact of a poor neighborhood may also 
impact health by having less access to health care, lower quality food in grocery 
stores, and less outside space that is safe for exercise. Women who live in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods have more stress, less emotional support, and were 
more likely to participate in unhealthy activities such as smoking, drinking 
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the pregnant woman and the child to have the support of both of 
his or her parents both during the pregnancy and afterwards, why 
not take a woman’s pregnancy into account in immigration—in 
favor of granting her rights to live in the United States—especially 
if the father resides here?18 And because having children is 
expensive and involves costs both during pregnancy and 
thereafter, why not grant tax breaks recognizing the dependency 
of a child even before he or she is born?19   
 
alcohol, or doing drugs. Conversely, women in safer or more stable areas have 
lower stress, more ties to the neighborhood, and healthier pregnancies. See Marie 
Lynn Miranda et al., Environmental Contributions to Disparities in Pregnancy 
Outcomes, 31 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 67, 68 (2009) (explaining that stressors such 
as poor health care, unemployment, high crime rates, high poverty rates, poor 
housing, and low income can have negative health effects on both the mother and 
the pregnancy).  
 18. In general, international law respects the right of people to marry and 
have a family. See Gallya Lahav, International Versus National Constraints in 
Family-Reunification Migration Policy, 3 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 349, 355 (1997) 
(“The notion that ‘the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State’ is often claimed to derive 
from natural law and is enshrined in international law.”). Family 
immigration— especially if the immigrant does not work outside the 
home— supports the “care economy,” which promotes the well-being of the family 
in general, including the physical, cognitive, and emotional development of the 
household. Immigrants who come to the United States via a family-based visa 
tend to have higher earning growth. Further, the creation of immigrant 
communities eases assimilation, promotes the formation of new businesses, and 
may revitalize rundown neighborhoods. See Fact Sheet: The Advantages of 
Family-Based Immigration, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 14, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/ZKJ9-53HF (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (“Families are crucial to 
the social and economic incorporation of newcomers.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The U.N. Expert Group report also explains 
that prolonged separation can lead to family members feeling guilty that they 
abandoned their family to pursue economic or social gain. Family separation may 
also lead to immigrants feeling unsettled and spending more time trying to 
immigrate their family members than on integrating into society. See Denise L. 
Spitzer, Family Migration Policies and Social Integration, U.N. EXPERT GROUP 
FAM. POLICIES FOR INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES 4 (May 2018), 
https://perma.cc/6A9P-QALV (PDF) (explaining that family members provide 
support to migrants and recognizing that “[p]rolonged familial separation can 
have deleterious effects on family members, adding stress to intimate and 
parent-child relationships and creating or exacerbating economic difficulties”); 
see also Philip E. Wolgin, Family Reunification Is the Bedrock of U.S. Immigration 
Policy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 12, 2018, 10:41 AM), 
https://perma.cc/XS4D-WG94 (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (explaining that family 
unity has historically been a shared value across ideological divisions) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. If a woman does not have health insurance, ultrasounds and other 
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None of these eminently humanitarian policies are required by 
an abortion ban that defines a “person” to include unborn human 
lives, but all would be morally consistent with such a piece of 
legislation. In an ideal world, whether an advocate labels herself 
“pro-choice” or “pro-life,” she would recommend consistently 
life-giving, family-friendly laws to benefit both women and their 
unborn daughters and sons. Professor Chatman missed this 
opportunity in her haste to portray Alabama-style legislation 
designed to protect unborn human life from abortion as irrational 
and impossible. 
 
prenatal visits and tests cost around $2,000. Prenatal vitamins are around $15 
per month. This does not include basic supplies for the baby, including clothes, 
diapers, a car seat, etc. For example, a pack of 250 diapers is around $40. 
Childbirth education classes range from $50 to $200. (prices vary). If a woman 
has a cesarean section, it costs almost $16,000. A vaginal birth costs around 
$9,600. See Heather Hatfield, What It Costs to Have a Baby, WEBMD, 
https://perma.cc/B4V8-42E9 (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) (detailing the expenses 
associated with having a baby) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also Hillary Hoffower & Taylor Borden, How Much It Costs to Have a Baby in 
Every State, Whether You Have Health Insurance or Don’t, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 9, 
2019, 12:56 PM), https://perma.cc/4BBR-GEWF (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) 
(noting that the average cost of giving birth in the United States is $10,808) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
